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[475] 
GENTLY INTO THE GOOD NIGHT: TOWARD A 
COMPASSIONATE RESPONSE TO END-STAGE 
ILLNESS 
by GEORGE P. SMITH, II* 
 
“Finished, it’s finished, nearly finished, it must be nearly finished.”1 
—Samuel Beckett 
 
End-of-life decision making by health care providers must respect 
individual patient values. Indeed, these values must always be viewed as the 
baseline for developing and pursuing patient-centered palliative care for 
those with terminal illness. Co-ordinate with this fundamental bioethics 
principle is that of beneficence or, in other words, respect for conduct which 
benefits the dying patient by alleviating end-stage suffering—be it physical or 
existential. Compassion, charity, agape and/or just common sense, should be 
a part of setting normative standards and of legislative and judicial responses 
to the task of managing death. Aided by the principles of medical futility, 
palliative care protocols, greater acceptance of a patient’s right to refuse 
treatment, and a spirit of basic humaneness, an ethic of adjusted care that 
seeks to secure dignity during the dying process without unreasonable 
interference by the state should be validated. 
I. TOWARD A STANDARD OF HUMANE CARE 
Caring, as a role and obligation for health care providers, may be seen as 
a moral obligation rooted in the time-honored principle of beneficence 
whose goal is to promote patient well-being.2 Considered as such, “caring 
indubitably incorporates empathy.”3 Incorporating caring into the 
 
* Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America. Parts of this essay are drawn from my 
article entitled, Refractory Pain, Existential Suffering, and Palliative Care: Releasing an 
Unbearable Lightness of Being, 20 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 469 (2011). This article is 
dedicated, with respect and admiration, to Joel G. Joffe, Baron Joffe, CBE, member of the 
House of Lords in the British Parliament—a strong and eloquent advocate for civil liberties, 
human rights, and the enactment of legislation validating compassionate assistance for those 
dying of terminal illness. 
 1. SAMUEL BECKETT, ENDGAME, act 1, sc. 1 (1957). 
 2. Paul Rousseau, The Fears of Death and The Physician’s Responsibility to Care for the 
Dying, 18 AM. J. HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE CARE 224, 224 (2001). 
 3. Id. The doctor-patient relationship has been termed a “moral relationship”—with care 
and empathy being at its core. Consequently, this gives rise to what is seen as a “morality of 
care” which imposes upon the physician a responsibility to accept patients as “concrete 
individuals” who, in turn, make concrete and immediate claims upon them in their role as 
physicians. Anjte du Bois-Pedain, The Duty to Preserve Life and its Limit in English Law, in 
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management of the terminally ill is, however, difficult. For the physician to 
convey to a patient that, “I could be you,” involves a sympathetic response 
which—ideally—may be initiated during the taking of the patient history.4 
During this process, a one-on-one relationship may be commenced which 
provides a mechanism for physician assessment and identification of the 
emotion the terminally ill patient is experiencing.5 The physician’s 
determination of the reason for the display of emotion and then a response to 
the patient’s emotion allows the patient to see that the physician made a 
“connection” between the emotion and its root cause.6 A line of 
communication is then opened. 
The physician’s establishment of an empathetic response has the direct 
effect of assuring patients that they will not be abandoned in their final days.7 
For many physicians, however, non-abandonment is instinctively difficult to 
honor because of “the fear generated by confrontation of their own mortality 
when caring for a dying patient.”8 Because of this situation, patient 
avoidance—unintentional though it may be—only serves to heighten patient 
fears of impending death.9 
As a consequence of these concerns and inadequacies among physicians, 
more often than not, issues of “existential care” are left to the nursing staff.10 
However, even in the daily hospital bed environment, it takes a special level 
of sensitivity for the nurses and health care assistants to understand questions 
raised by the patients, often indirectly, regarding the depth and severity of 
their distress over their terminal illness.11 Once understood, it remains for the 
nursing staff to devise a procedure for providing empathetic support—
 
THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW: THE LEGACY OF GLANVILLE WILLIAMS 296, 
305-11 (Dennis J. Baber & Jeremy Horder eds., 2013). See generally JONATHAN HERRING, 
CARING AND THE LAW 46-68 (2013) [hereinafter HERRING, CARING AND THE LAW] (discussing 
the origins of the ethics of care). 
 4. Rousseau, supra note 2, at 224-25. 
 5. Id. at 225. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id.; see also Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 477-82 
(2002) (explaining the importance of trust in patient-caregiver relationships). 
 10. See Rob Houtepen & David Hendrikx, Nurses and the Virtues of Dealing with 
Existential Questions in Terminal Palliative Care, 10 NURSING ETHICS 377, 377 (2003) (defining 
existential care situations as “cases where the patient’s question has such an existential, dramatic 
and personal purport, that the nurse experiences a special appeal to specific personal qualities in 
offering existential support”); see also Dean Whitehead, Beyond the Metaphysical: Health-
Promoting Existential Mechanisms and Their Impact on the Health Status of Clients, 12 J. 
CLINICAL NURSING 678, 678 (2003) (noting that existentialism, in a health context, means 
“maintaining or heightening the overall positive well-being of an individual”). In the context of 
existential questions, “patients tend to talk to nurses while they are still uncertain themselves 
about the nature of their wants and needs. Houtepen & Hendrikx, supra note 10, at 382. Thus, 
nurses’ communication with patients is of a more open and undetermined character than 
physicians’ communication.” Id. 
 11. Houtepen & Hendrikx, supra note 10, at 381. 
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especially when a sense of an ending, fin de siècle, pervades.12 
Alleviating Suffering 
While autonomy emerged in the 20th century as the dominant or 
capstone principle in biomedical ethics—supporting and complementing 
beneficence, non-malfeasance, and distributive justice13—it is well to 
reconsider its pre-eminence in complex cases of refractory pain. Indeed, once 
cases are presented where one’s quality of life is so severely diminished 
because of suffering, it is proper to advance an argument that necessitates 
reconfiguring or enhancing autonomy so that compassion becomes the 
operative bioethical principle in decision making at this level.14 Accordingly, 
in cases where end-of-life pain is intractable, efforts to address this condition 
and thereby assure a dignified death become a paramount state interest.15 
The goal of alleviating suffering, if acknowledged as a right to relief, 
requires action by the state and the health care providers and imposes upon 
them a co-ordinate responsibility to make prudential judgments that validate 
this right.16 Acknowledging and honoring such a right then becomes an act of 
“responsible benevolence,”17 or compassion, which is properly seen as 
complementing the duty to undertake actions that benefit the dying patient.18 
The duty to relieve pain is acknowledged as the “least disputed and the most 
universal of the moral obligations of the physician.”19 In reality, end-of-life 
 
 12. Id. at 381-85. 
 13. See Albert R. Jonsen, A History of Bioethics as Discipline and Discourse, in BIOETHICS: 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY, METHODS, AND PRACTICE 3, 11 (Nancy S. Jecker et al. 
eds., 2007) (explaining that bioethicists “worked out a general approach to ethical reasoning by 
affirming the relevance of a set of principles, namely, respect for autonomy, beneficence, 
malfeasance, and justice”); see also GEORGE P. SMITH II, BIOETHICS AND THE LAW: MEDICAL, 
SOCIO-LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL DIRECTIONS FOR A BRAVE NEW WORLD 6-9 (1993) 
(explaining that the three duties within the field of bioethics are autonomy, beneficence, and 
justice). 
 14. See Lois L. Shepherd, Sophie’s Choices: Medical and Legal Responses to Suffering, 72 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 103, 106 (1996) [hereinafter Shepherd, Sophie’s Choices] (“Once we 
decide that the suffering is sufficiently severe and the quality of life substantially diminished, 
then we are justified in treating the individual sufferer differently; we are justified in making 
decisions that erode autonomy and equality in the name of providing relief from suffering.”). 
 15. See id. at 118 (“Autonomy is firmly grounded in our Constitution’s protection of 
individual liberty; accordingly, liberty interests have been relied upon to support a 
Constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide and withdrawal of life support.”). 
 16. Id. at 146-47. 
 17. See LIEZL VAN ZYL, DEATH AND COMPASSION: A VIRTUE-BASED APPROACH TO 
EUTHANASIA 197-98 (2000) (“For euthanasia to be an act of responsible benevolence, it has to 
be considered as a last resort, when nothing else can be done to provide sufficient relief from 
suffering.”). 
 18. DAVID C. THOMASMA & GLENN C. GRABER, EUTHANASIA: TOWARD AN ETHICAL 
SOCIAL POLICY 192-94 (1990); see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR 
INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE? 304-05 (1997) (asserting that consenting terminally ill 
patients “need” to be allowed or assisted to end their lives whenever “a rational agent could 
prefer death to life”). 
 19. THOMASMA & GRABER, supra note 18, at 193 (quoting Edmund D. Pellegrino, The 
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autonomy is actually fortified by and through this new right of compassion. 
Of necessity, then, compassion becomes the denominator in health care 
decisions for end-of-life care20 and directs that efforts should be undertaken 
which not only refrain from causing pain or suffering but relieve it as well.21 
II. LEGAL CARING RESPONSES IN A JUST SOCIETY 
American history shows rather remarkably that instead of being 
perceived as vital to maintenance of a just society, the capacity to care has 
been often seen as antithetical to it.22 There “has been a deformation of both 
the private ethic of care and the very public ethic of legal justice”23—all as a 
direct result of this attitude. This, in turn, has meant that not only have the 
ideals and practices of justice been uncaring, but the ideals and practices of 
care “have been unjust” with a “deflation of both virtues” resulting.24 Rather 
than viewing caregiving as an emotional, morally arbitrary response, it should 
be more properly accepted as an ethical activity—with the beliefs and the 
values of care accepted as “integral to the development of just people and a 
just society.”25 Indeed, care or compassion must be recognized as a universal 
 
Clinical Ethics of Pain Management in the Terminally Ill, 17 HOSP. FORMULARY 1493, 1493 
(1982)). 
 20. Id. at 126. 
 21. MARGARET P. BATTIN, ENDING LIFE: ETHICS AND THE WAY WE DIE 90-91 (2005) 
[hereinafter BATTIN, ENDING LIFE]. See Robin M. Henig, A Life-or-Death Situation, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG., July 21, 2013, at 27 (describing Margaret Battin’s personal family tradgedy of being 
forced to deal with her husband’s medical condition—since 2008—as a quadripilegic and her 
distress in attempting to honor and to be responsive to her husband’s ambiguous and fluctuating 
communcations regarding the continuation or cessation of his medical treatment. Discerning 
what is an informed and abiding decision by her husband to die from a response to transient 
despair is problematic). 
 22. See ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 9 (1997) (“For most of our history . . . our 
capacity to care has not been regarded as necessary to the capacity to do justice (indeed, it is 
more typically regarded as antithetical to it) . . . .”). For a discussion of society’s views on the 
compatibility of justice and care, see MICHAEL D. FINE, A CARING SOCIETY?: CARE AND THE 
DILEMMAS OF HUMAN SERVICE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 52-74 (2007) (“Justice is portrayed in 
many of these discussions as an essentially masculine value involving the application of abstract 
and impersonal principles to the public world, while the ideals of care are seen as values deriving 
from the personal and private world of the home and family . . . . In this dichotomous way, care 
came to be seen as an essentially feminine perspective, emphasizing the ties between people 
rather than their autonomy.”); and see also JONATHAN HERRING, OLDER PEOPLE IN LAW AND 
SOCIETY 127 (2009) (discussing generally the disparate focuses of the ethics of justice and the 
ethics of care, but concluding that the two separate ethics are interdependent in the care context: 
“it is so important that those sympathetic to an ethic of care emphasize the importance of 
upholding justice within relationships”). 
 23. WEST, supra note 22, at 9. 
 24. Id. 
 25. FINE, supra note 22, at 63 (quoting Margaret Moore, The Ethics of Care and Justice, 20 
WOMEN & POL. 1, 14 (1999)); see also HERRING, supra note 22, at 124-27 (discussing five 
aspects relating to an ethic of care). Specifically, Herring states that “the values that are 
promoted within an ethic of care are not isolated autonomy or the pursuance of individualized 
rights, but rather the promotion of caring, mutuality, and interdependence.”  HERRING, supra 
 
Spring 2013] GENTLY INTO THE GOOD NIGHT 479 
 
moral principle,26 which is vital to the very fabric of social justice.27 
Within every adjudication, it has been suggested that neutral principles 
of law, or those standards that transcend the instant case, should operate.28 
Perhaps these principles or standards are to be found within the very 
principle of equity;29 and from equity flows—arguably—mercy, sympathy, 
compassion, humaneness or love.30 David Hume, an eighteenth century 
British philosopher, opined that the basis for a system of justice and social 
solidarity was, in fact, tied to expressions of natural sympathy for others.31 
Arthur Schopenhauer, the German philosopher, maintained that compassion 
“is the real basis of all voluntary justice.”32 Accordingly, for an action to have 
moral value, it must derive from compassion.33 
Defined as an acknowledgment of another’s suffering, which prompts a 
response to assist in alleviating the suffering, compassion is often regarded as 
the motivation for subsequent merciful acts.34 Mercy is oftentimes used 
synonymously with compassion or benevolence.35 Indeed, acts of this nature 
 
note 22, at 126. See also HERRING, CARING AND THE LAW, supra note 3, at 320-22 (discussing 
the idea of social justice). 
 26. See FINE, supra note 22, at 60-61 (“The principles of care should be able to provide 
universal moral guidelines if it can be shown that they meet two essential tests. First, the 
principles of care must be able to provide moral guidance on important decisions . . . . Second, 
they must be capable of being developed as a set of abstract principles that could be employed 
for regulating public life.”); ALBERT R. JONSEN, THE NEW MEDICINE AND THE OLD ETHICS 
126 (1990) (discussing in care how to balance competence and compassion, stating “[c]ompassion 
must be circumscribed, just as competence is restrained. The circumscription does not mean any 
diminution of human feeling, but instead its universalization”). 
 27. See MARIAN BARNES, CARING AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 158 (2006) (“Care-giving makes a 
significant contribution to social well-being and the achievement of social justice—not only 
directly through support received by particular individuals which can contribute to their capacity 
to resist oppression and participate in social life, but also by offering practical examples of an 
ethical basis for social relations which recognize equality as an objective to be achieved.”). 
 28. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 
1, 17, 29 (1959). 
 29. See generally WILLIAM Q. DEFUNIAK, HANDBOOK ON MODERN EQUITY, ch. 1 (2d ed. 
1956) (discussing equity and jurisprudence); Garrard Glenn & Kenneth Redden, Equity: A Visit 
to the Founding Fathers, 31 VA. L. REV. 753, 756 (1945) (“Equity exists . . . for corrections of 
situations ‘wherein the law, by reason of its universality, is deficient.’”). Equity may be defined 
as not only “the quality of being equal or fair . . .” but, “given in accordance with natural justice . 
. . something fair and right.” V OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 358 (2nd ed. 1989). 
 30. See Steven Tudor, Modes of Mercy, 28 AUSTRL. J. LEGAL PHIL. 79, 95 (2003) (discussing 
the term “mercy” and its connotations). 
 31. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 293-307 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 1896). 
 32. ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER, ON THE BASIS OF MORALITY 144 (E.F.J. Payne trans., 
Hackett Publishing 1998) (1965) (emphasis removed); see WILLIAM S. SAHAKIAN & MABEL 
LEWIS SAHAKIAN, IDEAS OF THE GREAT PHILOSOPHERS 49 (1993) (summarizing 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy). 
 33. SCHOPENHAUER, supra note 32, at 144. 
 34. Tudor, supra note 30, at 81. See also Patrick Guinan, The Christian Origin of Medical 
Compassion, 5 NAT’L CATHOLIC BIOETHICS Q. 243, 243 (2005) (discussing the role of 
compassion in medicine); Martha C. Nussbaum, Compassion: The Basic Social Emotion, 13 SOC. 
PHIL. & POL’Y 27, 37 (1996) (discussing compassion and its relationship to justice). 
 35. Tudor, supra note 30, at 81. 
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have been termed “responsible benevolence”36 or “compassionate mercy.”37 
For others, charity is seen as the ultimate value in caring for the dying;38 
and they suggest beneficence and benevolence may combine, properly, to 
become “loving charity.”39 When there is suffering, its elimination or 
management is central to a caring response and can well be seen as trumping 
the biomedical principle of autonomy.40 
Modernly, it has been urged that sympathy and compassion must be 
integrated into contemporary law.41 A contemporary and principled rule of 
law, then, needs notions of decency and compassion within its sinews42 and 
does not have to conflict with a rule of love.43 Others have called for the law 
to be empathetic or to incorporate concepts of love, altruism, and 
sympathy.44 
 
 36. VAN ZYL, supra note 17, at 197. 
 37. BATTIN, ENDING LIFE, supra note 21, at 66; see also TIMOTHY E. QUILL, DEATH AND 
DIGNITY: MAKING CHOICES AND TAKING CHARGE 129-32 (1994) (illustrating how the difficult 
decision of how to approach end-of-life care with a loved one can be perceived as both agonizing 
and admirable). 
 38. See Edmund D. Pellegrino, Decision at the End of Life: The Use and Abuse of The 
Concept of Futility, in THE DIGNITY OF THE DYING PERSON 219, 222-23 (Juan De Dios Vial 
Correa & Elio Sgreccia eds., 2000) [hereinafter Pellegrino, Decision] (explaining that Christians 
have an obligation to care for the sick and the vulnerable). 
 39. Id. at 225, 241. 
 40. Shepherd, Sophie’s Choices, supra note 14, at 119-24 (analyzing the constitutional, 
medical, and ethical conflicts that exist between the right to be free from suffering and the right 
to autonomy). See generally du Bois-Pedain, supra note 3, at 319-24 (discussing the tenuous 
relationship between a doctor’s moral and legal duties in caregiving and alleviating end-of-life 
suffering). 
 41. Laurence Tribe, Revisiting the Rule of Law, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 726, 729-30 (1989) 
(criticizing the Supreme Court of the United States for taking an unbending position on the Rule 
of Law—one that fails to account for “sympathy and compassion”). 
 42. Id. at 731. 
 43. Id. at 729; see also SAMUEL FLEISCHACKER, INTEGRITY AND MORAL RELATIVISM 7-8 
(Michael Krausz ed. 1992) (discussing how both cultural relativism and individual desires impact 
ethical orientations); JOHN FLETCHER, SITUATION ETHICS: THE NEW MORALITY 69-71 (1966) 
(arguing that, so long as one’s intention to act is anchored in love, the end result justifies the 
means); Hugh LaFollette, The Truth in Ethical Relativism, 22 J. SOC. PHIL. 146, 146 (1991) 
(arguing that a “cultivated moral judgment” should be the normative standard of conduct, rather 
than a routine application of existing moral rules). 
 44. See Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1576 (1987) 
(arguing that empathy, or lack thereof, is helpful in understanding many important Supreme 
Court decisions in the last century). For Adam Smith, the process of judging involves a lesson in 
learning the importance of impartiality by imagining how an impartial spectator would act in a 
particular situation: “Moral judgment is either approval or disapproval of an action. Judging is a 
complex matter and forms the last step in a process which relies upon human beings’ capacity for 
sympathizing. Sympathy does not mean compassion; Smith defines it in a neutral way to mean 
what we call empathy.” James E. Alvey, The ‘New View’ of Adam Smith and the Development 
of his Views Over Time, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON ADAM SMITH’S THE THEORY OF MORAL 
SENTIMENTS 66, 71 (Geoff Cockfield et al. eds., 2007) (internal citation omitted). See RICHARD 
A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 117 (2008) [hereinafter POSNER, JUDGES] (observing that an 
element of judicial decision making is “good judgment,” which is a compound of several 
qualities, including empathy and common sense). 
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One of the inherent weaknesses of the rule of law has been said to be its 
all too often efforts to distance itself from human experience.45 Certainly, by 
introducing human values or attitudes into the judicial process, a strong claim 
could be made that these elements might well conflict with the ideal of 
judging, which is sustained by rational and objective argumentation, not by 
feelings and emotions.46 Indeed, empathetic discourse in the courtroom may 
well be seen as either irrelevant or merely as “policy” and, thus, treated 
dismissively.47 
Principles, Emotions, and The Holmesian Caveat 
While principles provide the foundational framework for standards of 
normative conduct, feelings are important when individuals or micro issues 
arise which, in turn, test the extent to which principles are valid in their 
application within the context of a given situation or norm of conduct.48 It is 
asserted that “the morally good person is not just principled, but also 
compassionate.”49 In addition, that person not only exhibits “practical 
wisdom”50 but “common sense”51 in assuring patient dignity or quality of life 
 
 45. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDOZO, HOLMES, 
JEFFERSON, AND WYTHE AS MAKERS OF THE MASKS 111-51 (1976) (describing how the law 
dehumanizes the very people to whom it applies, such as, for example, Helen Palsgraf, the 
blinded plaintiff in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (1928), who is referred to simply as 
“A” in the Restatement of Torts as presented to the American Law Institute in 1929). 
 46. See Benjamin Zipursky, DeShaney and The Jurisprudence of Compassion, 65 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1101, 1122 (1990) (“An apparent problem with advocating the judicial embrace of 
compassion is that it seems to conflict with the ideal of judging as a rational and objective 
activity.”). But see MARTIN L. HOFFMAN, EMPATHY AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR CARING AND JUSTICE 270 (2000) (“Empathy can contribute to both sides of 
caring-justice dilemmas because of empathy’s congruence with both, though it is less likely to 
contribute to the justice side when productivity is the issue, as is usually the case in our 
society.”). 
 47. Henderson, supra note 44, at 1588 (“Law as a closed system that is self-referential can 
draw the line in such a way as to dismiss empathic discourse or understanding as ‘irrelevant’ or 
as ‘policy’ argument beyond the auspices of the law.”). See David Brooks, The Limits of 
Empathy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/30/opinion/brooks-the-
limits-of-empathy.html (referencing a recent paper by Professor Jesse Prinz, of the Graduate 
Center Philosophy department at the City University of New York, who argued that empathy 
“subverts justice” where it allows the individual “to experience the illusion of moral progress 
without having to do the nasty work of making moral judgments” and “to experience delicious 
moral emotions without confronting the weaknesses in our nature that prevent us from actually 
acting upon them”). 
 48. FIONA RANDALL & R.S. DOWNIE, PALLIATIVE CARE ETHICS: A GOOD COMPANION 12-
13 (1996) (“Principles provide the framework, but we must remember our feelings; the morally 
good person is not just principled, but also compassionate.”). 
 49. Id. at 13. 
 50. Id. at 24 (“As a result of their professional experience those involved in palliation may be 
able to offer a range of advice and discussion based on practical wisdom generated by interaction 
between their own personality, and their experience of health care and life in general.”). 
 51. Id. at 73 (“Common sense has a part to play in health care ethics . . . . Ordinary reasoning 
and moral intuition lead to the conclusion that the effective relief of suffering in terminal illness 
may sometimes justify the use of measures which entail a risk of shortening life.”). 
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is preserved throughout all palliative care treatments.52 
The best way to assure this mandate or goal of compassion throughout 
cases of adjusted palliative care management is to embrace a test of medical 
utility in determining what end-stage options should be made available as 
treatment.53 Accordingly, a benefits-to-burdens/risk calculus should be 
utilized to assess the utility of one medical treatment over another.54 
Anchoring such an evaluation should be the doctrine of medical futility, 
which acknowledges the practical limits of medical treatment in all cases.55 
While compassion is experienced and evaluated subjectively,56 it need 
not stigmatize a valid legal theory.57 Indeed, in the case of DeShaney v. 
Winnebago County Department of Social Services,58 Justice Harry 
Blackmun, in dissent, addressed the importance of compassion in judicial 
analysis and interpretation by observing that “compassion need not be exiled 
from the province of judging.”59 He went further and stated that when courts 
remove “natural sympathy” from a case, they are thereby prevented “from 
recognizing either the facts of the case before it or the legal norms that 
should apply to those facts.”60 
Eschewing emotion as a dominant vector of force in truth seeking in 
law,61 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. urged that the reasoning behind a 
particular rule’s adoption “ought to be of paramount importance.”62 And, 
 
 52. Id. at 71; Annette F. Street & David W. Kissane, Constructions of Dignity in End-of-Life 
Care, 17 J. PALLIATIVE CARE 93, 95, 99 (2001). 
 53. RANDALL & DOWNIE, supra note 48, at 192 (asserting that medical utility “include[s] 
patient need and the ability to benefit from both the process of care and the specific 
interventions of care”). 
 54. Id. at 116-18. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Zipursky, supra note 46, at 1142. 
 57. Id. at 1147; see also Lois Shepherd, Face to Face: A Call for Radical Responsibility in 
Place of Compassion, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 445, 449, 457 (2003) [hereinafter Shepherd, Face to 
Face] (calling for a greater prominence for caring responses in law and a sense of “shared 
humanity”). 
 58. 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
 59. Id. at 213 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 60. Id. at 212. 
 61. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES: SELECTIONS FROM THE 
LETTERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND OTHER WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL 
HOLMES, JR. 119 (Richard A. Posner ed. 1992) [hereinafter HOLMES, SELECTIONS] (asserting 
that with regard to seeking the truth in law, “it is useful to omit the emotion and ask ourselves 
what those [imperfect social generalizations that make up our system of morality] are and how 
far they are confirmed by fact accurately ascertained”). 
 62. Stephen W. Smith, Some Realism about End of Life: The Current Prohibition and The 
Euthanasia Underground, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 55, 55 (2007). See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, 
PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY 107 (2003) (arguing ordinary people have little interest in 
complex policy and—with half of the population with I.Q.s of below 100—limited intellectual 
depth); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, Address Before the Boston University 
School of Law (Jan. 8, 1897), in 110 HARV. L. REV. 991, 992-93 (1897) [hereinafter Holmes, The 
Path of the Law] (giving examples to illustrate the practical importance of understanding the 
reasons of the law). See RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: 
INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE 386 (1994) (discussing how large 
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when the reasons for structuring the rule have disappeared, it is improper to 
maintain the rule “from blind imitation of the past.”63 
Surely, the reasons behind the prohibitions and restricted use of terminal 
sedation as a means of care in palliative treatment of patients in end-stage 
care need to be, at minimum, re-evaluated and even expanded to include 
such care of terminally-ill patients suffering severe psychological distress. An 
individual suffering at the end of his or her life may display forms of 
emotional, psychological, and existential suffering such as despair, 
helplessness, isolation, and loss of self-respect.64 The legal system should 
acknowledge a right not to suffer.65 Accordingly, physicians should have a 
professional responsibility to validate this right to the extent that they can 
under sound medical practice, and alleviate the suffering. 
III. A CONTEMPORARY MODEL IN LEGAL DECISION MAKING 
The law should accord a greater “caring response”66 or a “sense of 
shared humanity”67 in its interpretation and application. Indeed, a caring 
response is one of several humanistic values essential to sustaining the rule of 
law.68 Oftentimes, however, such values are challenged as being in conflict 
with abstruse “moralistic abstractions about liberty, equality and dignity.”69 
Unquestionably, decisions in health care concerning the maintenance of 
life and the hastening of death often pose complicated moral questions, 
which are anchored in normative reasoning, which—in turn—may, or may 
not, be relevant or cogent because of changing contemporary values.70 If 
moral reasoning is either ambiguous or ineffectual, courts will tend to rely on 
“moral intuitions,” or “assumptions about intrinsic normative order” found 
 
proportions of people with the type of behaviors and problems that dominate the nation’s social 
policy agenda have limited cognitive ability). 
 63. Holmes, The Path of the Law, supra note 62, at 1000. See generally ROGER S. 
MAGNUSSON, ANGELS OF DEATH: EXPLAINING THE EUTHANASIA UNDERGROUND 261 (2002) 
(discussing the complexity of rules against euthanasia in context of suffering AIDS patients who 
prefer to choose death over life). 
 64. VAN ZYL, supra note 17, at 196. 
 65. THOMASMA & GRABER, supra note 18, at 192. 
 66. See Shepherd, Face to Face, supra note 57, at 449 (arguing that caring responses should 
play a bigger role in law and policy decisions); see also du Bois-Pedain, supra note 3, at 324 
(“[E]ven if care morality and its demands can only be imperfectly translated into legal norms, 
the law . . . must strive to do so even at the cost of some compromise to legal certainty and to the 
internal requirements of rule-based governance.”). 
 67. See Shepherd, Face to Face, supra note 57, at 456-57 (explaining the differences between 
compassion and pity). 
 68. Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REV. 959, 969-71 (2008); 
see also Kathryn Webb Bradley, Knowing Law’s Limit: Comments on “Forgiveness: Integral to 
Close Relationships and Inimical to Justice?”, 16 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 322, 323-26 (2009) 
(arguing that the notion of forgiveness becomes complicated in the family law context, 
particularly with regard to divorce proceedings). 
 69. Siegel, supra note 68, at 1030. 
 70. Steven D. Smith, De-Moralized: Glucksberg in the Malaise, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1571, 
1589 (2008) [hereinafter Smith, De-Moralized]. 
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implicitly “in the natural course of life.”71 Determining normative 
assumptions that animate moral judgments is a difficult task, and analytical 
frameworks of this nature that rely on non-verifiable subjective values often 
invite conflict.72 
In order to lend greater legal precision to their analyses, courts can 
choose to embrace the philosophy of Holmes, which prizes logic over 
experience.73 By adhering to legal formalism, moral judgments are avoided 
altogether74—in large part because there is an awareness that it is very 
difficult to safeguard and sustain social solidarity if emotional values are 
given recognition in the processes of judicial decision making.75 If, however, 
formalism is rejected, judicial deference can then be given to “tradition and 
convention”76 as a construct for discerning moral convictions or discovering 
shared humanity instead of a rigid adherence to “academic reasoning.”77 
The best approach to, or model for, judicial decision making is one that 
achieves a balance between logical reasoning and, when appropriate, “critical 
morality” as opposed to traditional conventional morality.78 As such, courts 
must endeavor to apply a situation ethic rather than an unyielding and rigid 
normative standard, and then proceed to acknowledge love or agape as the 
controlling moral principle in all judicial decision making.79 Stated otherwise, 
guided by compassion or humaneness, the judiciary should interpret ever-
evolving social values and the social conditions that shape those values.80 
 
 71. Id. at 1589 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 72. Id. at 1590. 
 73. See HOLMES, SELECTIONS supra note 61, at 237, 239 (explaining the evolution of law 
based on tradition to law based on logic). 
 74. Smith, De-Moralized, supra note 70, at 1589-90. 
 75. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 68, at 979 (stating that “[j]udicial statesmanship means that 
judges must seek not only the “right answer” to legal questions as a matter of professional 
reason but also an answer that sustains the social legitimacy of law”); Cass R. Sunstein, Due 
Process Traditionalism, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1543, 1544 (2008) (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 
521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122-24 (1989); Moore v. City 
of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)) (describing how the Supreme Court has appealed to 
arguments of tradition rather than emotion); see also WILLIAM F. SULLIVAN, EYE OF THE 
HEART: KNOWING THE HUMAN GOOD IN THE EUTHANASIA DEBATE 136 (2005) (discussing the 
role of emotions in evaluations and their objectivity). 
 76. Smith, De-Moralized, supra note 70, at 1590. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See id. (explaining how courts side with “tradition and convention,” but academics side 
with “critical morality” and “reasoning”). Judge Richard Posner suggests that judges employ a 
type of reasoning termed “cultural cognition.” POSNER, JUDGES, supra note 44, at 116. Cultural 
cognition is “a valid though flawed sense of knowledge” because when a judge uses cultural 
cognition, he is allowed to consider his personal vision of those policies important to him in 
order to advance his model of a good society. Id. at 117. “The personal, the emotional and the 
intuitive” are factors used in judicial making—with the intuitive being a salient factor in 
appellate review. Id. at 120. 
 79. See FLETCHER, supra note 43, at 52 (defining “situation ethic” as a method of decision 
making that does not rely strictly on pre-conceived rules, but rather asks “how to do good for 
whom; not what is love but how to do the most loving thing possible in the situation”). 
 80. Siegel, supra note 68, at 981. 
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These values and conditions necessarily change with the facts of each case 
and, thus, so do the extent to which compassion and humaneness are 
pertinent. The ultimate goal of judicial decision making should, in the end, be 
a “practical realization of the rule of law.”81 
IV. DETERMINING PATIENT VALUES AND BEST MEDICAL INTERESTS 
Patient values must always be viewed as the baseline for developing and 
pursuing patient-centered palliative care for terminal illness.82 Best patient 
care, ideally, is adjusted to a patient’s changing medical condition.83 Palliative 
care provides adjusted care by endeavoring to relieve end-stage suffering of 
all kinds—physical and psychological.84 If relief from suffering is viewed as a 
patient right,85 then, health care providers and the state have a basic 
responsibility to establish policies designed to validate this right and follow a 
course of action that seeks to honor a patient’s desire for an easeful death. 
Indeed, there is a medical duty to act to benefit the dying patient, for relief of 
pain “is the least disputed and most universal of the moral obligations of the 
physician.”86 Accordingly, both law and medicine must set standards or 
protocols that allow for the wider adoption and use of terminal sedation as an 
efficacious and humane practice for end-stage care of hospice patients.87 
Ultimately, the determination of the parameters of a patient’s best 
 
 81. Id. at 979; see also George P. Smith, II, Judicial Decisionmaking in the Age of 
Biotechnology, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 93, 101 (1999) (explaining that the 
law serves to define and protect individual rights, ensure public order, resolve disputes, optimize 
economic efficiency, dispense justice, and provide for a structure for preventing or compensating 
injury, among other things). 
 82. Timothy E. Quill, Physician-Assisted Death in the United States: Are the Existing “Last 
Resorts” Enough?, 38 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 17, 21 (2008) [hereinafter Quill, Physician-Assisted 
Death]. 
 83. THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, TAKING CARE: ETHICAL CAREGIVING IN 
OUR AGING SOCIETY 216-17 (2005); see also THOMASMA & GRABER, supra note 18, at 192 
(discussing the right to control decisions regarding one’s own medical conditions). 
 84. See Evan D. Anderson & Corey S. Davis, Breaking the Cycle of Preventable Suffering: 
Fulfilling the Principle of Balance, 24 TEMP. INT’L. & COMP. L. J. 329, 329-30 (2010) (discussing 
the use of therapeutic opioids in palliative care to prevent suffering); see also Joanne Kenen, A 
New Focus on Easing the Pain, WASH. POST, July 3, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/06/29/AR2007062902064_pf.html (stating that the “main goal [of 
palliative care] is to improve a patient’s quality of life” by “managing pain, nausea or respiratory 
problems better”). 
 85. THOMASMA & GRABER, supra note 18, at 192. 
 86. Margaret P. Battin, Euthanasia: The Fundamental Issues, in READINGS IN HEALTH 
CARE ETHICS 363, 363 (Elisabeth Boetzkes & Wilfred J. Waluchow eds., 2000). See generally du 
Bois-Pedain, supra note 3, at 321 (“The explanation [of the recognition of care morality within 
the criminal law] . . . lies, quite simply, in the presence of the doctor’s duty of care which exhorts 
him to relieve the patient’s suffering. It is this duty which counterbalances and ultimately 
ovverides certain prohibitions of actions.”). 
 87. Paul Rousseau, Existential Suffering and Palliative Sedation: A Brief Commentary with 
a Proposal for Clinical Guidelines, 18 AM. J. HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE CARE 151, 152-53 (2001). 
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medical interests is shaped by policies of reasonableness88 and compassion.89 
Neither reasonableness nor compassion are capable of a precise formulation, 
but rather are tied inextricably to issues of proportionality or cost/benefit 
analysis,90 which, in turn, must remain fact-sensitive and shaped by the 
“accepted standards of medical . . . practice” applicable within each medical 
case presented.91 
A. Medical Futility and Proportionality 
The popular notion within American society—that there is a required 
prescription to treat under all circumstances—needs to be re-evaluated and 
brought into contemporary focus through acceptance of the doctrine of 
medical futility.92 Under this recognized doctrine, when medical care is 
complemented by the test of proportionality imbedded presently in the 
principle of double effect,93 the central treatment question becomes whether 
the burdens of treatment clearly outweigh its benefits to the patient and 
would be inhumane if continued.94 In those cases where medical treatment is 
 
 88. GEORGE P. SMITH, II, FINAL CHOICES: AUTONOMY IN HEALTH CARE DECISIONS 109 
(1989) [hereinafter SMITH, FINAL CHOICES]. 
 89. See EDMUND D. PELLEGRINO & DAVID C. THOMASMA, FOR THE PATIENT’S GOOD: 
THE RESTORATION OF BENEFICENCE IN HEALTH CARE 55 (1988) (describing compassion as 
one of the ideal characteristics that physicians should possess in addressing patients’ wishes). See 
also MARGARET SOMERVILLE, THE ETHICAL IMAGINATION: JOURNEYS OF THE HUMAN SPIRIT 
222 (2009) (observing that “compassion and courage are companions”). 
 90. See BARRY R. SCHALLER, UNDERSTANDING BIOETHICS AND THE LAW 4 (2008) (using 
the term “ethinomics” to “describe the convergence of ethics and economics” and recognizing 
the concern of some that acknowledging this convergence could dehumanize the process of 
medical decision making); Joseph Boyle, Enriching Proportionalism Through Christian 
Narrative in Bioethics: The Decisive Development in Richard McCormick’s Moral Theory?, 14 
CHRISTIAN BIOETHICS 302, 304, 306-08 (2008) (discussing proportionalism as a consequentialist 
form of moral analysis where, in order to reach a moral judgment, all aspects of an action—
including its side effects—are compared or balanced in terms of their ultimate effect on the 
human good). 
 91. SMITH, FINAL CHOICES, supra note 88, at 173-74; see Lawrence J. Schneiderman et al., 
Medical Futility: Its Meaning and Ethical Implications, in BIOETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE HISTORY, METHODS, AND PRACTICE 408, 409 (Nancy S. Jecker et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007) 
(explaining that the doctrine of medical futility can be understood and applied in a practical and 
common sense way). 
 92. See DANIEL CALLAHAN, THE TROUBLED DREAM OF LIFE 199 (1993) (“There is a 
deeply embedded presumption in medicine: when life is at stake, there should always be a bias in 
favor of treatment.”); id. at 203-06 (explaining the five stages of rejection of life-extending 
treatment, ranging from “a refusal to respond to all health threats” to “an eagerness to pursue 
any medical treatment”). 
 93. The principle of double effect, stated succinctly, sets forth a ethical framework for 
determining when it is permissible to undertake action that achieves a good result (e.g., the 
alleviation of pain and suffering of end-stage illness) even though a negative or bad result (e.g., a 
hastening of death) will flow from the initiating conduct. SMITH, FINAL CHOICES, supra note 88, 
at 47-49, 55-59, 101-05. See also George P. Smith, II, Refractory Pain, Existential Suffering, and 
Palliative Care: Releasing an Unbearable Lightness of Being, 20 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 
469, 500 (2011) [hereinafter Smith, Refractory Pain] (explaining the doctrine of double effect). 
 94. For Callahan, testing the burdens and benefits of treatment modalities is tied ultimately 
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seen as futile, terminal sedation should be recognized as but a part of end-
stage total symptom management and validated as an integral part of 
palliative management.95 Once end-stage, terminal suffering is managed 
more effectively, the law must change the legal taxonomy and reliance on the 
principle of double effect in testing whether assistance in ending life is capital 
murder or euthanasia.96 Instead, the degree of necessity for providing 
compassionate assistance to dying patients—together with an assessment of 
the soundness of the medical judgment of the health care providers rendering 
the assistance—should be pivotal in legal analysis of end-stage care. Indeed, 
the central or “fundamental part” of the end-of-life “equation” for making 
rational medical decisions must always be seen as “the patient’s quest for a 
dignified death”97 or, alternatively, the “least worst death.”98 A good death is 
 
to the principle of medical futility. CALLAHAN, supra note 92, at 215-16. A treatment is 
medically futile and improper to undertake only if it will likely raise a strong probability of 
death, extended pain, and suffering; extend a state of unconsciousness which is not curative; or 
greatly increase the near certainty of “a bad death” despite a promise of an extension of life. Id. 
at 201-02. 
 95. See Smith, Refractory Pain, supra note 93, at 474-76, 478 (arguing for the necessity of 
terminal sedation as a form of palliative care in order to compassionately alleviate suffering and 
“enhanc[e] patient autonomy”). 
 96. Under the principle of double effect, medical treatment is ethically permissible when: the 
health care provider provides good or morally neutral care, intends a good effect to result and 
not one which is untoward, and the good resulting from the initiating action is proportionate to 
any consequential evil (i.e. a good or positive result may not be used as a direct causal 
consequence of an evil result). See SMITH, FINAL CHOICES, supra note 88, at 101-03 (arguing 
that the double effect principle should be replaced by a standard of reasonableness, 
consideration of the best interests of the patient, and a cost/benefit analysis to decide what 
“treatment or non-treatment should be pursued”). 
 97. TIMOTHY E. QUILL, DEATH AND DIGNITY: MAKING CHOICES AND TAKING CHARGE 51 
(1993); see also Quill, Physician-Assisted Death, supra note 82, at 20-21 (noting that “[t]here are 
two main clinical situations” where last-resort options potentially including physician-assisted 
death may arise, namely, with “[p]atients who are worried about future suffering and wonder 
what options would be available to them . . . [and p]atients who eventually experience suffering 
that is unacceptable to them”). 
 98. MARGARET P. BATTIN, THE LEAST WORST DEATH: ESSAYS IN BIOETHICS ON THE END 
OF LIFE 38 (1994); see also George P. Smith, II, All’s Well That Ends Well: Toward a Policy of 
Assisted Rational Suicide or Merely Enlightened Self-Determination?, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
275, 418 (1989) (“Determining a patient’s best interests are thus grounded in policies of 
reasonableness and humaneness. It is an inhumane and callous argument that protracts the 
agony of death by using gastronomy tubes, nasogastrict tubes and other means of providing 
alimentation under the guise of being efficacious treatment.”). With the legalization of assisted 
suicide, Judge Richard Posner asserts—based on empirical reasoning and a utilitarian calculus—
that such action may lead to fewer rather than more suicides where physical incapacity is 
implicated. RICHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE 243-51 (1995) [hereinafter POSNER, 
AGING AND OLD AGE]. The argument advanced here is that those overwhelmed with the fear of 
becoming totally incapacitated from terminal medical conditions are forced into a course of 
action which means that they either kill themselves while still capable or face the distinct 
prospect of ultimately becoming incompetent and losing their autonomy to die accordingly. Id. 
Whether such a course of action would be cost-effective remains difficult to determine, however, 
since the medical costs associated with administering this assistance could be borne by third 
parties. Id. 
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said, commonly, to be one that occurs “after a long and successful life, at 
home, without violence or pain, with the dying person being at peace with his 
environment and having at least some control over events.”99 
B. The Right to Refuse Treatment 
Rather than continue a quest to establish a constitutional right to 
assisted suicide,100 perhaps—in the final analysis—the time-honored common 
law right to refuse treatment should be seen as the corner stone for building a 
more compassionate and enlightened ethic of understanding in managing 
end-of-life issues.101 This right of refusal is not a right to hasten death, but 
rather merely a right to resist unwanted physical invasions.102 
With the passage of the Patient Self-Determination Act in 1990,103 
Congress took a bold first step to validate the right to refuse treatment.104 
This legislation strengthened patient autonomy by allowing newly-admitted 
hospital and nursing home patients to choose whether they wished to accept 
or refuse specified medical treatment during the course of their 
confinement.105 
Additional steps in building an arsenal to safeguard a framework for 
 
 99. Graham Scambler, Death on the Edge of the “Lifeworld,” in DEATH RITES AND RIGHTS 
163, 172 (Belinda Brooks-Gordon et al. eds., 2007) (quoting Clive Seale & Sjaak van der Geest, 
Good and Bad Death: An Introduction, 58 SOC. SCI. & MED. 883, 855 (2004)). 
 100. See, e.g., George J. Annas, The Bell Tolls for a Constitutional Right to Physician-
Assisted Suicide, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1098, 1098 (1997) (“The debate about a constitutional 
right to physician-assisted suicide, on the other hand, was abruptly ended on June 26, 1997, the 
day the U.S. Supreme Court issued two unanimous rulings on the issue.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 101. See id. at 1102 (“The right to refuse treatment, on the other hand, is a long-recognized 
right that physicians are legally and ethically required to honor. Patients have a right to insist 
that their bodies not be invaded without their consent.”). 
 102. NEW YORK TASK FORCE ON LIFE & THE LAW, SUPPLEMENT TO WHEN DEATH IS 
SOUGHT: ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT 7 (2006), available 
at 
http://www.health.ny.gov/regulations/task_force/reports_publications/select_reports/assisted_sui
cide_and_euthanasia/docs/supplement.pdf; see also LOIS SHEPHERD, IF THAT EVER HAPPENS 
TO ME: MAKING LIFE AND DEATH DECISIONS AFTER TERRI SCHIAVO 59-60 (2009) (“A 
number of state courts recognizing the right to refuse treatment have chosen instead to rely on 
the right against unwanted intrusions of the body found in the common law . . . , explicit rights to 
privacy in state constitutions . . . , statutory rights, or some combination of these legal sources.”). 
See NEIL M. GORSUCH, THE FUTURE OF ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA 181-215 (2006) 
(discussing case law addressing the intersection of the right to refuse treatment and the 
“inviolability of life” with regards to competent and incompetent patients and those with and 
without an intent to die). 
 103. Patient Self-Determination Act, Pub. L. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388–115, 1388–204 (codified 
at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (2006). 
 104. See Lee Uzych, Book Review, 283 JAMA 2454, 2454 (2000) (reviewing LAURENCE P. 
ULRICH, THE PATIENT SELF-DETERMINATION ACT: MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF PATIENT 
CARE (1999)) (noting that to Ulrich “the spirit of the ‘Act’ is intended to achieve the 
transformation of the patient from passive to highly active participant in the therapeutic 
decision-making process”). 
 105. Id. 
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principled decision making in end-of-life cases were taken by the 
development of the Uniform Health Care Decisions Act,106 the successful 
efforts of some states to enact pain relief statutes,107 the Death with Dignity 
statutes of Oregon108 and Washington,109 and the medical protocols for use of 
palliative (hospice) care and terminal sedation.110 These “weapons” in the 
arsenal serve to protect and encourage sound, reasonable medical judgments 
and, thus, in a very real way, balance physicians’ powers and protections with 
patient rights of autonomy. 
C. Utility, Common Sense, and Compassion 
Utility,111 most assuredly, comes into play after medical conditions are 
 
 106. UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT §§ 1-19, 9 U.L.A. 93 (1993). The Uniform Health-
Care Decisions Act has been adopted in some form by ten states. Thaddeus Mason Pope, A New 
Revised Uniform Healthcare Decisions Act, MED. FUTILITY BLOG (Dec. 3, 2011), 
http://medicalfutility.blogspot.com/2011/12/new-revised-uniform-healthcare.html. The Act 
allows an attending physician to disregard a request for the initiation or continuation of care 
when a determination by the physician is made that such action would be ineffective and 
contrary to generally accepted “health care standards.” UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 
7(f). 
 107. Some twenty-one states have pain relief laws—with eighteen allowing marijuana to be 
used for medicinal purposes (e.g., the relief of pain). State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L 
CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/state-medical-
marijuana-laws.aspx (last visited May 31, 2013); see also Jessica Chiu et al., Access to 
Therapeutic Opioids: A Plan for Donors, NGOs and Governments, 24 TEMP. INT’L. & COMP. L. 
J. 417, 442 (2010) (indicating the need for clear goals and funding strategies at a national level in 
order to make opioid medication more accessible to individuals who need it). 
 108. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800(12), 127.805(1) (2011). 
 109. WASH. REV. CODE § 245.020 (2009). Although not declaring a constitutional right to die 
with dignity, the Montana Supreme Court held on December 31, 2009, that—under the state’s 
Rights of The Terminally Ill Act—competent terminally ill patients can request physician 
assistance in obtaining a prescription for a lethal dose of medicine to be self-administered; and, 
further, the Act shields physicians from civil or criminal liability for any such assistance. Baxter 
v. Montana, 224 P.3d 1211, 1215 (Mont. 2009). The Vermont Legislature passed legislation 
comparable to that in place in Oregon and Washingon in May 2013. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 
5281 (2013). See Paula Span, Vermont Passes ‘Aid in Dying’ Measure, N.Y. TIMES THE NEW 
OLD AGE BLOG (May 14, 2013, 10:18 AM), 
http://newoldage.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/14/vermont-passes-aid-in-dying-measure/?_r=0 
(“Vermont will become the fourth state to make it legal for a physician to prescribe lethal 
medication to a terminally ill, mentally competent patient who wants to end his life.”). 
 110. See, e.g., Position Statements: Statement on Artificial Nutrition and Hydration Near the 
End of Life, AM. ACAD. HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE MED. (Dec. 8, 2006), 
http://www.aahpm.org/positions/default/nutrition.html (explaining the suggestions of the 
American Academy of Palliative Medicine). See MARK LEVINE, AM. MED. ASS’N, REPORT OF 
THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, SEDATION TO UNCONSCIOUSNESS IN END-
OF-LIFE CARE, CEJA REPORT 5-A-08, 6-7 (2008), for the suggestions of the American Medical 
Association. 
 111. Medical utility may be defined “as the maximization of the welfare of patients in need of 
treatment.” George P. Smith, II, Utility and the Principle of Medical Futility: Safeguarding 
Autonomy and the Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 12 J. CONTEMP. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 36 (1995) (internal citation omitted). Utilitarianism requires determining 
which course of medical treatment will “produce the greatest benefit for the greatest number of 
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assessed and evaluated and a treatment prognosis is charted.112 It is within 
the boundaries of utility that the principle of medical futility is tested and 
determined to be efficacious or, as to a particular case, invalid.113 Cost/benefit 
(or, simply proportional) analysis of treatment options is central to a 
determination of medical futility,114 since this determination is—first and 
foremost—but a clinical judgment and not an encompassing moral evaluation 
or principle on the “worthlessness” of a life.115 Whether the operative 
normative standard for policy making be termed agape,116 charity,117 
compassion,118 love,119 or mercy,120 the common or unifying denominator to 
palliative care is a humane, morally responsible approach to dealing with 
intractable suffering at the end-stage of life. 
Good judgment is to be expected of judicial decision makers just as it is 
for healthcare providers. As a quality in reasoning, good judgment is 
characterized as “an elusive faculty best understood as a compound of 
empathy, modesty, maturity, a sense of proportion, balance, a recognition of 
human limitations, sanity, prudence, a sense of reality and common sense.”121 
 
individuals.” Id. 
 112. Id. at 28 (explaining that utility should be determined by “weigh[ing] the gravity of the 
harm in allowing lifesaving actions versus the utility of the benefits stemming from the actions,” 
a balancing test which requires that the medical condition be thoroughly evaluated). 
 113. See id. (“The utility of the benefits would be measured in terms of an evaluation of the 
positive consequences that flow to the threatened individual and to society. In truth, then, this 
balancing test seeks to arrive at a cost-effective decision through a cost-benefit analysis.”) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 114. See Vijay N. Joish & Gary M. Oderda, Cost Utility Analysis of Quality Adjusted Life 
Years, 19 J. PAIN & PALLIATIVE CARE PHARMACOTHERAPY 57, 57 (2005) (explaining how 
cost-benefit analysis can help allocate limited medical treatment resources). It has been 
suggested that any determination of futility should be jointly made by the physician, patient, and 
surrogate decision maker, with an eye to “strike[] a balance between three criteria: effectiveness, 
benefit, and burden,” in achieving the patient’s good. Pellegrino, Decision, supra note 38, at 227. 
 115. Pellegrino, Decision, supra note 38, at 220, 227. See Amir Halevy, Medical Futility, 
Patient Autonomy, and Professional Integrity: Finding the Appropriate Balance, 18 HEALTH 
MATRIX 261, 286 (2008) (“[P]rofessional standards and professional integrity must, with 
appropriate procedural safeguards, trump the medically inappropriate demands of a patient or 
family.”). 
 116. Defined as a “sense of Christian love.” I OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 243 (2d ed. 
1989). 
 117. See Pellegrino, Decision, supra note 38, at 241 (advancing charity as an attribute of end-
of-life care and treatment). 
 118. Defined as “pity that inclines one to spare or to succor.” III OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY 597 (2d ed. 1989). 
 119. Defined as “[t]hat disposition or state of feeling with regard to a person which . . . 
manifests itself in solicitude for the welfare of the object . . . .” IX OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY 52 (2d ed. 1998); see Joseph Fletcher, Love Is the Only Measure, 83 
COMMONWEALTH 427, 429 (1966) (“Good is first and foremost the good of people. Christians 
call it ‘love,’ meaning neighbor-concern or agape. This love means, of course, a social attitude, 
not the romantic emotion that the word has come to connote in popular literature.”). 
 120. Defined as a “[d]isposition to forgive or show compassion.” IX OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY 625-26 (2d ed. 1989). 
 121. POSNER, JUDGES, supra note 44, at 117. 
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Elusive though such judgment may be to capture or own, sound, reasoned 
judgments in medico-legal decision making must be the norm and not the 
exception. 
To initiate or continue with medically futile treatment should be 
recognized as simply wrong; for, acting in such a manner not only denies the 
fact of human finitude but additionally imposes unnecessary effort, expense, 
and emotional trauma on both patients and other affected parties.122 When 
efforts to treat futile medical conditions are undertaken, such actions serve as 
a total abnegation of one of the cardinal principles of medical ethics—namely 
beneficence.123 
It has been argued persuasively that while the state may declare a 
legitimate interest in morality,124 for it to meet a heightened level of judicial 
scrutiny on review of such end-of-life declarations, it faces an increasingly 
difficult challenge to justify a decision to sacrifice “claims of associational 
autonomy”125—grounded as such “in ‘expressive’ association or in ‘intimate’ 
association”126—in order to protect public morality. Accordingly, the state 
must take care to eschew administrative, judicial, or legislative 
determinations that abridge “choices central to personal dignity and 
autonomy, [which] are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”127 
It is logical to assume that the right to compassionate care in end-stage 
illness is, indeed, grounded in a liberty interest and, thus, cannot be unduly 
challenged or restricted by a state interest in judging the “morality” of 
autonomous actions designed to give purpose and promote the basic interest 
in liberty to die with dignity.128 Society’s central obligation is to refrain from 
mandating one moral code over another, and, instead, to define and 
safeguard “the liberty of all”129 and promote social policies which address 
 
 122. Pellegrino, Decision, supra note 38, at 234 (suggesting that refusing treatment due to 
economic concerns “could . . . be an act of charity in the interests of one’s family or to society at 
large”). 
 123. Id. at 223; see PELLEGRINO & THOMASMA, supra note 89, at 29 (discussing several 
examples of court cases that emphasized “patient’s wishes . . . as a means for protecting the 
patient’s best interests”). 
 124. Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak 
Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1935-36 (2004). 
 125. Id. at 1936. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
 128. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573-74, 578 (2003) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 
478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)) (explaining that intimate and personal 
decisions central to personal dignity and autonomy are central to the liberty protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
 129. Casey, 505 U.S. at 850. The right of privacy from governmental intrusions, expressed in 
Griswold v. Connecticut and Eisenstadt v. Baird, add to the strength of the liberty of 
associational expression found in Lawrence, in arguing for a right to die with dignity without 
unduly burdensome state interference. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965) 
(explaining that various guarantees in the Bill of Rights create “zones of privacy”); Eisenstadt v. 
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the 
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suffering with charity, compassion, and common sense.130 Intregal to this 
societal obligation is recognition of a co-ordinate duty of health care 
providers “not to prolong dying.”131 This duty arguably coalesces with and, 
indeed, validates the very principle of beneficence,132 and—accordingly—
shapes a new “right” of the terminally ill not to endure refractory pain and 
existential suffering at the end-stage of life,133 and, thus, ensure that death 
occurs with some semblance of dignity.134 
 
individual . . . to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so 
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”). 
 130. See DAVID C. THOMASMA, HUMAN LIFE IN THE BALANCE 194-95 (1990) (describing 
social policies that could support a commitment to control pain and address suffering); see also 
du Bois-Pedain, supra note 3, at 297 (arguing that the duty of care “should be understood as 
giving rise to a distinct moral, and consequently also to a distinct legal regime”); HERRING, 
CARING AND THE LAW, supra note 3, at 88-101 (considering the role of the state in providing 
care). See generally Nancy K. Knauer, Aging in the United States: Rethinking Justice, Equality, 
and Identity Across the Lifespan, 21 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 305 (2012) (discussing 
University of Virginia Professor Lois Shepard’s view that on end-of-life medical care should be 
“approached . . . with consideration to patient’s wishes, values, intrerests, and relationships—and 
without special laws”). 
 131. THOMASMA, supra note 130, at 194. This duty should be triggered when one is diagnosed 
as terminally ill, has made a determination (or executed an advance directive) that, because of 
medical conditions, life no longer has personal meaning, or when, even though no such decision 
has been made by the patient and there is no advance directive, there is nonetheless a medical 
realization that the terminal illness is “in its imminent phase and the patient is no longer able to 
participate in the spiritual and material goods of human life.” Id. 
 132. See PELLEGRINO & THOMASMA, supra note 89, at 26-27, 32-35 (explaining that 
beneficence acts towards the best interests of the patient). 
 133. See ERIC J. CASSELL, THE NATURE OF SUFFERING AND THE GOALS OF MEDICINE 273-
76 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing “[t]he progression of suffering” and noting that “the experience of 
illness of which the pain in part is fed by external events such as unhappy interactions with 
physicians, medical, care, or institutions, the injury to the patients begins to broaden”); see also 
Jeffrey T. Berger, Rethinking Guidelines for the Use of Palliative Sedation, HASTINGS CTR. 
REP., May/Jun. 2010, at 32, 32-33 (2010) (explaining that palliative sedation can provide relief for 
patients at end of life). 
 134. See EPSTEIN, supra note 18, at 311 (describing “the needless amount of suffering that” 
takes place at the end of life without assisted suicide); CHARLES FOSTER, HUMAN DIGNITY IN 
BIOETHICS AND LAW 170-72 (2011) (discussing the concerns of dignity in end-of-life scenarios 
and various British cases involving such situations); POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE, supra note 
98, at 260 (advocating for a right of physician-assisted suicide for the terminally ill); see also 
Henig, supra note 21, at 42 (discussing Professor Margaret Battin’s notion that two essential 
moral constructs must be operating in tandem before physician assistance at death should be 
allowed: namely, autonomy—with a sincere patient acknowledgment of a wish to die—and 
mercy, a medical conclusion that death assistance is the only way in which intractable pain and 
suffering can be abated). 
